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Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah
Ten Sefiroth of Nothingness
Their end is imbedded in their beginning
and their beginning in their end
like a flame in a burning coal
For the Master is singular
He has no second
And before One, what do you count?
Sefer ha-Yetzirah∗
                                                 
∗ Cf. Sefer Yetzirah – The Book of Creation, (ed. Aryeh Kaplan), York Beach ME, Boston MA,
1997, p 57; the English translation is by Aryeh Kaplan.
The “Emergence” of Existence –
from Pregeometry to Prephysics
by Dan Kurth
(version: draft, 24.08.2013)
Q:                                               ‘pourquoi donc y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien?’1
A:  ‘ .. nam nulla est unquam quies vera .. , nec a quiete aliud nasci potest quam quies’2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Introduction
Already on the first pages of his most expository paper ‘Über Gegenstandstheorie’3 Meinong
makes a clear distinction between the theory of objects on the one hand and traditional
metaphysics and ontology on the other. This distinction doesn’t relate only to the respective
scopes of these different subjects but also to the traditionally implied preferences concerning the
topic of universals. By intensively stressing his main point, namely that nonexistent objects are
just this: not existing, Meinong not only emphasizes that as a defining difference to the objects of
traditional metaphysics and ontology4 but makes this in itself to become a statement of an
implicit theory of universals. That it is for the very reason that Platonism and (Aristotelian)
Realism albeit in different disguise state just this: universals exist, either above (or before) or
within the single objects. And then again: the (nonexistent) objects of the theory of objects, some
of which go by the same name as such alleged universals, just do not exist.
Thus in contrary to the common accusation of having infinitely extended the number and sorts of
objects Meinong’s theory of objects is inherently nominalistic5 and suffices the decree of
ontological parsimony or Occams razor: Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
For giving a better understanding and analysis of e.g. fictionals, the implied objects of general
abstract terms and even allegedly self-contradictory objects or any other nonexistent objects
                                                 
1 G.W.Leibniz, Principes de la nature et de la grâce; in: G.W.Leibniz ,1961, Die Philosophischen
Schriften, (ed. C. J. Gerhardt, vol. VI,): pp. 598 – 606, p. 602. This is the so called ‘fundamental
question of metaphysics’: “Why is there something rather than (just) nothing?”
2 G.W.Leibniz, specimen dynamicum, pars II, in: G.W.Leibniz, Mathematische Schriften, (ed.
C.J.Gerhardt), vol.VI, p 252. ( … for there is not any real (state of) rest .., and from (a state of)
rest not anything else can come up (alt.: follow, emerge, D.K.) than rest.)
3 A.Meinong, “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, in: “Untersuchungen zur Gegegenstandstheorie und
Psychologie” ed. A.Meinong, Leipzig 1904, pp.1-50; pp.4-7
4 Ibid. p.5
5 Cf. ibid. p.6-8
doesn’t mean at all to increase the number of ontological elements. It doesn’t even mean to
increase the number of the respective concepts or statements in the least; it is just an attempt to
get a deeper insight into them.
Moreover the theory of objects equipped with a nominalist inclination, which I will argue for as
well as suppose in this paper, allows even for a most parsimonious ontology, where ‘ontology’ –
as in Meinong’s view – is just that specific part of the theory of objects, which is occupied with
such abstract and concrete objects (and their respective relations), which are presumed to exist.
Das Seiende ist wie die Schaumkrone einer Welle
 auf dem Ozean des Nichtseienden.6
2 The theory of objects or objectology and the objects of
science
I will introduce the neologism ‘objectology’ which just stands for an alternative translation of
‘Gegenstandstheorie’ as compared with the original ‘theory of objects’. I do so for two reasons,
the first one based on the fact that in the English language there is no equally proper and swift
adjectival and adverbial use related to the expression ‘theory of objects’ possible, which could
match the respective adjectival and adverbial expression ‘gegenstandstheoretisch’ in German.
The second reason for introducing that neologism is that, despite it seemingly being the proper
literal translation, ‘theory of objects’ has quite different connotations from that of
‘Gegenstandstheorie’ in Meinong’s use.
Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie was not meant, designed or ever performed as a particular theory
of whatever sorts of objects. Quite on the contrary it was from it’s beginnings a philosophical
analysis of an utmost fundamental and comprehensive concept of object, so fundamental and
comprehensive that the entirety of what had in the philosophical traditions been labelled as
ontology (with all of its various objects) made up just a minute part of that – objectology.
2.1 Meinongian semantics with nominalist flavor
b Looking for objects of science in Meinong’s Jungle
Mereological underdetermination
Toposic constraints
The concept of ‘object’ in category and topos theory
                                                 
6 The existent (objects) is (are) alike the foam-crest of a wave in the ocean of the non-existent
(objects).
Toposes in difference to Sets are literally made of or erected upon the functorial
structure or ‘dynamics’ of their respective objects. Therefore other than sets
toposes can be conceived as ontological innocent or at least neutral since their
objects are just (nonexistent) individuals - albeit abstract ones.
2.2 Objects of science
All objects of science are nonexistent objects, since they are of a purely conceptual
or – more precisely – theoretical nature. But of course they are intended to be
pragmatically related to actually existing objects, i.e. objects, with which we can
and do more or less directly interact.
Ontological commitment implies the fragility of the assumed
‘existence’ of the objects of science
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Physica ergo ... desinit in geometriam, nec ante ullum
phaenomenon penitus in corporibus intelligemus,
quam ex primis figurae motusque ideis derivamus.7
3 Pregeometries for prephysics8
3.1 The paradox of reductionism – terminating
                                                 
7 G.W.Leibniz, Dissertatio exoterica de statu praesenti et incrementis novissimis deque usu
geometriae, in: G.W.Leibniz, Mathematische Schriften, (ed. C.J.Gerhardt), Bd.VII p 325);
(Physics namely ... fades away into geometry, and we won’t know any phenomenon deeply in its
corporeal construction as long as we haven’t derived it from the first principles of (geometrical)
figures and of motion.)
8 By “prephysics” I will go further than Gabriele Veneziano and M Gasperini with the notion of
pre big bang physics weiter ausführen!
3.2 The quest for primordial emergence, and the
indispensability of nonexistent objects
3.3 Pregeometry I: The original proposal and else
Examples of pregeometries: , Wheeler, Pregeometry, Sorkin, causal Sets,
Combinatorial hierarchy, Finkelstein, Leibniz Code, Isham, Doering
(Quantum)Cellular Automata can not be seen as a model for a pregeometry
since they already use a structured space as an indispensable background for their
operations.
============================================
Finkelstein, Leibniz Code
Wheeler, It from Bit
I strictly disagree with the subjectivist features of both of these approaches,
namely the action based concept of physics in the case of Finkelstein, and the idea
of a participatory observership in the case of Wheeler. And it is clear that these
features are undoubtedly essential and defining for either of these proposals for
another kind of pregeometry. Yet I still fully agree with another element in both
approaches, an element, which would seem tightly intertwined with the
subjectivist features of action based physics or participatory observership, namely
with the view, that information is the real stuff a pregeometry has to be made of.
================================================
Example of prephysics: TQFT, Spin network, Spin foam (cf. also Wolfram, A new
Kind of Science (category <—> spin network )
3.4 Ethereal gunk
Gunk is seemingly of a continuous nature.
Therefore, since I hold with the most strong conviction that reductionism is the
very apt and appropriate way of analyzing and exploring nature and beyond, yet at
the same time I’m being not less convinced, that for coming nature – or anything
at all – into existence a primordial emergence has to be presumed, one has to look
for an appropriate kind of stuff, i.e. an appropriate kind of gunk, yet – then again –
a not so ‘greasy’ one.
rs
rs
Hier die hebräische Version einsetzen und in
FN zitieren als Sefer ... (Book of nonexistence (Google translater), 
€ 
∃ x, iii, 14
That, what will be,
 will be becoming for the effort
 of something to become itself
‘CONATUS est exercitium virium seu virtutis.’9
                                                 
9 (G.W.Leibniz, Opuscules et Fragments Inédits de Leibniz (ed. L.Couturat), Paris
1903/Hildesheim 1961, Table de Définitions, p 481) (The effort/impuls is the realization of the
forces or the virtue/vigour).
Now, obviously that pun isn’t precisely to our point.
4 The emergence of existence
4.1 Objects and Automorphisms
To set the stage for the following we at first will introduce the scope, i.e. the kinds
of elements, we will deal with.
The only objects which are admitted on the elementary stratum of objectology,
which is elementary gunk, are objects and morphisms, i.e. the objects of
elementary gunk are objects and morphisms.
At a next emergent stratum of objectology the admitted objects then will be
objects, morphisms, and emergent connectivity structures between objects.
Before we will have a closer look at ethereal gunk, i.e. elementary automorphic
objects 
€ 
eamObni , we firstly have to reconsider, what ordinary automorphisms (of
ordinary objects onto themselves) are.
Essentially an automorphism 
€ 
f A→A  of an object A is an isomorphism 
€ 
gA→A  from A
as the source (domain) of 
€ 
gA→A  onto A as the target (codomain) of 
€ 
gA→A , with
€ 
A : idA , i.e. A being the identical object, thus it may be imagined in the following
form: 
Equivalently an automorphism 
€ 
f A→A  can be defined as a bijective isomorphism of
an object A onto itself, either in the form: 
€ 
A f A↔A← →   A  or, in case that 
€ 
f A↔Ais a
bijective isomorphism between an object A and its identical double A, as:
€ 
A f A↔A← →   A.
An alternative definition is to say that a morphism 
€ 
f A→A  is called an
automorphism, when there is a mutual inverse 
€ 
gA→A , with   
€ 
f o g = idA  and
  
€ 
g o f = idA , or
                                                                                                                                                               
Therefore a purposively arranged version more to the topic of ‘elementary automorphic objects’
and their rôle in the emergence of existence should perhaps go as follows: ‘CONATUS
INTELLEGIBILIS est exercitium actionis primordialis seu primi ordinis’ (The conatus of a
nonexistent object is the realization of the primordial action or the order of the beginning).
A€ 
f A→A
 →   
g A→A
 A.
In all of these definitions a rather trivial condition is, that the object A – as the
source or domain of the automorphism 
€ 
f A→A  and as well as the target  or
codomain of 
€ 
f A→A  – is the identical object (or at least an identical double or copy
of A), and in particular, that it also remains the same object with respect to its
automorphisms, i.e. it doesn’t change or becomes changed by those
automorphisms.
The elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni , which we will introduce in the
following, however change or become changed by their respective (partial)
automorphisms 
€ 
g eamObnx → eamObn 'x  and 
€ 
h eamObn 'x → eamObnx+1 , i.e. the real target (or
codomain) object 
€ 
eamObnx+1  of the unique automorphism 
€ 
f eamObnx→ eamObnx+1  will not
be the same object as the source (or domain) object 
€ 
eamObnx (of 
€ 
f eamObnx→ eamObnx+1 ).
4.2 Ethereal10 Gunk11: Elementary Automorphic Objects
Existence is a feature essentially attached to objects. Thus the emergence of
existence has to be seen as the emergence of existing objects, i.e. objects having
the feature to exist, up from (a state being made of) nonexisting objects, i.e.
objects not having the feature to exist. There is no existence not being embodied in
the existence of an object (or of objects).
We have recourse to toposes as means of providing the indispensable dynamics for
the mereological and mereotopological (structure of the) emergent objects of the
pregeometry we will expose in the immediate following. Furthermore it is just
such dynamics which will restrain the infinities of mereological composability to
the pluralities of the possible ontologies which can be assumed as being made of
some kinds of automorphic objects as proposed in the following.
                                                 
10 ...and even pure and clean as well ...
11 The term‘Gunk’ relates to such kind of ‘mereological stuff’, where all parts of a (gunky) whole
have further proper parts. Gunk then is infinitely divisible, since every part of it itself again has
proper parts. I.e. a gunky object is not made of and does not dissolve in indivisible mereological
atoms. The term‘Gunk’ has been introduced by David Lewis. Cf. David Lewis, Nominalistic Set
Theory, Nous, 4 (1970); and David Lewis, Parts of Classes, Oxford 1991, pp 20-21, 88-89
========================
For showing, that elementary automorphic objects are the proper stuff gunk is
made of, we will have a closer look on the ‘mathematical’ structure of elementary
automorphic objects.
there are countable infinite elementary automorphic objects of the described kind
and any one of these is iteratively ‘composed’ of again a countable infinite
succession of elementary automorphic objects, – with no lower or upper limit, i.e.
there is no initial or terminal elementary automorphic object in any of these
iterative or successive generations.
there is no highest (ranking) or terminal automorphic object since by definition
any elementary automorphic object becomes instantaniously itself the object of its
automorphism (or perhaps better: in its automorphic action) and by this
automorphic action the next (higher ranking) elementary automorphic object is
generated and so on ad infinitum.
Therefore an elementary automorphic object eamOb (here informally seen as an
element of the set eamOB) fits the following condition
(1) 
€ 
∀xeamOb∃xeamOb: xeamOb∈ eamOb eamObn i{ }
with 
€ 
n ∈ {N} and 
€ 
n ≠ 0  for any 
€ 
eamObn ;
  and with 
€ 
i ∈ { N}{ +N} for any 
€ 
eamObn i
========================
Elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni suffices the categorical structure of a
respective commutative diagramm, even with a smack (but not more than that) of a
topos since they have:
a) a source (or domain) object 
€ 
eamObnx ,
b) a target (or codomain) object 
€ 
eamObnx+1 , which is – so to say – the
real target of the automorphic action(s) in question,
c) an intermediary object 
€ 
eamObn'x  which is – so to say – the ‘same’
as the initial object 
€ 
eamObnx . Here 
€ 
eamObnx  is the source of the
respective automorphism 
€ 
g eamObnx → eamObn 'x , whereas 
€ 
eamObn' x  is
the ‘same’ object, now however as the intermediary target that
automorphism 
€ 
g eamObnx → eamObn 'x  is directed to.
d) (partial) automorphisms 
€ 
g eamObnx → eamObn 'x  and 
€ 
h eamObn 'x → eamObnx+1
with 
€ 
g : 
€ 
eamObnx
g →  eamObn' x , and
€ 
h : 
€ 
eamObn' x
h →  eamObnx+1
e) the unique automorphism 
€ 
f eamObnx → eamObnx+1
with 
€ 
f : 
€ 
eamObnx
f →  eamObnx+1 , and thus
   
€ 
f =g oh
as can be seen in that commuting diagramm:
€ 
eamObn' x
€ 
eamObnx
€ 
eamObnx+1
€ 
g € 
h
€ 
f
A graphic fragment of the recursive structure of (the potentially infinite succession
of) the 
€ 
eamObni can be seen in the following figure:
€ 
eamObnx
€ 
gx
€ 
eamObnx+1
€ 
hx
€ 
f x
€ 
eamObnx
€ 
gx€ 
gx+1
€ 
eamObnx+1€ 
eamObnx+2
€ 
hx+1
€ 
eamObnx
€ 
gx€ 
gx+1
€ 
eamObnx+1€ 
eamObnx+2
€ 
f x+ 2
========================
An encouraging and important byproduct of this inner design of the infinite depth
of the composition of elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni is that it dissolves
the distinction of mereological atoms (or simples) on the one hand and gunk on the
other. Undoubtedly elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni  have proper parts,
namely automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni− j (with 
€ 
j,i ∈ { N}{ + N} and 
€ 
j<i), where
any of them are equipped with their respective automorphisms 
€ 
g eamObnx → eamObn 'x
and 
€ 
h eamObn 'x → eamObnx+1  – and that even in an infinite succession – as it is required
for gunk.
Yet as elements of a class of objects (namely the set eamOB) the single
elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni  serve equally well as the mereological
atoms of an utmost elementary or primordial layer of everything that exists – and
even of that, which not exists.
The reason for this of course is that – according to its definition – any single
elementary automorphic object 
€ 
eamObnx  is properly distinct from any other single
automorphic object 
€ 
eamObny (with 
€ 
y ≠ x ), which again follows from the fact, that
the ensemble of the elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni  is as discrete and
countable as the elements of the set (of the Natural Numbers) 
€ 
N.
Now let us resume what we’ve achieved so far. With the introduction of ethereal
gunk, i.e. the elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni , we solved the seeming
paradox of a terminating reductionism. We solved that paradox not by bringing the
reductionist paradigm to rest, but by letting it proceed harmlessly, so to speak by
letting it come to itself – infinitely. And we did so with a most parsimonious use of
power – no more than the power of 
€ 
N.
------------------------------------------------
The entirely nonmaterial nature (or substance) of elementary automorphic objects
may not be in line with David Lewis’ intended use for gunk and also not with the
normal use of mereological atoms, yet elementary automorphic objects fit
perfectly for both rôles.
4.3 Toposes of emergence built on higher dimensional
gunk: weak 2-categories (
€ 
2−amObtor,
€ 
2−amObtub ) 12
Objects in mereological toposes are mereological parts, mereological sums, the
morphisms are not only all mereological and mereotopological operations in any
admitted composition, but also any other admittable morphism between the
respective objects.
----------------------
‘meros’ stands for an abbreviation of ‘mereolgical space’, therefore the plural should
go as ‘meroses’ (for ‘mereological spaces’). As in the case of ‘topos’, where topos
originally wasn’t meant to stand for the Greek term for ‘place’ or ‘location’, also
in the case of ‘meros’ meros doesn’t stand for the Greek word for ‘part’. A meros
is meant to be a mereolgically based analogon of a topos. A topos can be seen as a
categorical version of a set or a categorised set, a meros then should be seen as a
categorical version of mereology or a categorised mereology, with mereological
parts and mereological sums or mereological compositions as characteristic
objects. In a meros then a mereological part may very well be a mereological sum
itself and a mereological sum may be a mereological part in another setting or if
seen from another viewpoint. The morphisms between the objects in a meros are
not only the admitted mereological operations but all admitted dynamical relations
between the respective mereological parts and mereological sums as well.
=======================================
The fact of (the) ‘matter’: Toposic foundations of existence
---------------------------------------------
As we’ve seen in the preceeding paragraph elementary automorphic objects
€ 
eamObni  serve perfectly well as gunk, or more precisely, as ethereal gunk on the
one hand and as mereological atoms equally well on the other. That makes them to
be an ideal stuff for a pregeometry, but it still not makes them to be a proper
pregeometry after all.
The entirety of the 
€ 
eamObni  as ethereal gunk or as a class of mereological atoms
just lacks what structure ever to carry any pregeometry. And also stressing the
sound mereological nature of this entirety of the 
€ 
eamObni  doesn’t help for now
with respect to that lack of structure in the least.
                                                 
12 For a strictly mereological version see Appendices
It is rather the categorical nature of the single elementary automorphic objects
€ 
eamObni that helps. We’ve seen that the 
€ 
eamObni are generated by the described
iterative succession of automorphic actions, represented by the automorphisms
€ 
g eamObnx → eamObn 'x  and 
€ 
h eamObn 'x → eamObnx+1 on an elementary automorphic object
€ 
eamObnx (or respectively automorphisms 
€ 
gi  and 
€ 
hi on elementary automorphic
objects 
€ 
eamObni ). And we are of course rigorously restricted to that means.
But only having 
€ 
eamObni and automorphisms 
€ 
gi  and 
€ 
hi at our disposal doesn’t
preclude a somewhat peculiar performance of these automorphisms.
---------------------------------------------
A topos is a multifaceted ‘creature’ – somewhat alike an elephant perhaps. (FN: cf.
P.Johnstone, Sketches of an Elephant, vol. 1 –3. Having seen these sketches one
must wonder how an eventually finished painting of this creature might look like.)
To stress only the two most elementary facets a topos can be seen as a categorical
version of a set, i.e. a category with the universality of sets yet with a categorical
structure substituting the set theoretical notions of elements and membership by
those of objects and morphisms. So one has to keep in mind that a topos is
primarily a category, namely a categorical version of a set and therefore had
originally been introduced by analyzing the category of sets. (FN: Lawvere,
ETCS)
Definition v Topos nach McLarty
The local (or internal) universe made of the objects and morphisms of a topos (FN.
J.L.Bell, Toposes and local set theories) then can also be seen as a topological
space spanned by these morphisms and objects. That aspect originally lead to the
term topos (as an abbreviation of ‘topological space’, with the respective plural
form ‘toposes’ – from ‘topological spaces’ – instead of the also frequently used
graecism topoi).
For the purpose of this paper most important is the fact that the categorical
structure of a topos perfectly fits for representing a ‘categorical dynamics’ in a
respective universe of objects and the morphisms between them. Providing a
proper frame for such ‘categorical dynamics’ was not only one of the primary
motivations which ) originally lead to the first introduction of topos theory, (FN.:
Lawvere, ETCS. (FN.: Lambek, Heraclitus) but it is also something, that makes
topos theory even more indispensible for finding the setting for an emergence of
existence than it already is for its singular blend of universality and locality.
=======================================
In the foregoing we’ve introduced elementary automorphic objects
€ 
eamObni , which together with the morphisms 
€ 
ama : 
€ 
eamObnx
ama →  eamObn' x
and 
€ 
amb : 
€ 
eamObn' x
amb →  eamObnx+1  build the category eamOb.
=================================================
Yet single elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni , despite their categorical
structure, don’t build a topos, simply for the reason that a single elementary
automorphic object isn’t a proper set. And their sufficiently universal entirety, i.e.
the set eamOb of all elementary automorphic objects doesn’t also make it for a
topos of emergence, namely due to the obvious lack of – at least – a respective
terminal object.
Therefore we can only claim that for their categorical structure elementary
automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni fit or belong to a category eamOb as its
instantiations.
This claim is also corroborated by the fact that any 
€ 
eamObni can be seen as an
automaton in the category theoretical description, since it satifies all required
conditions. (FN. Eilenberg, …, Ehrig, Universal theory of Automata)
But then single elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni  still do not constitute
such toposes of emergence, which could carry the intrinsical categorical dynamics
of a topos to propagate the structural increase required for the emergence of the
existence of possibly existing objects (up from a state of nonexistent objects).
Yet our quest for such toposes of emergence will not end here.
Let us again come back and consider what we have gained and what we are
allowed to do with that.
elementary automorphic objects 
€ 
eamObni , which together with the
morphisms 
€ 
ama : 
€ 
eamObnx
ama →  eamObn' x  and 
€ 
amb :
€ 
eamObn' x
amb →  eamObnx+1
morphism 2-
€ 
amb  which leads to higher dimensional automorphic
objects 
€ 
amOb2−dim
=======================================================
higher dimensional automorphic objects (
€ 
amObtor ,
€ 
amObtub ) in weak 2-
categories (
€ 
2−amObtor ,
€ 
2−amObtub ),
€ 
amObtor is of a toroidal shape, therefore we will call it the ‘toroidal
automorphic object’ and 
€ 
amObtub  is of a tubular (or hose or any topologically
equivalent, e.g. spherical) shape, therefore we call it the ‘tubular automorphic
object’
€ 
amObtor ,
€ 
amObtubare homotopically not eqivalent.
These higher dimensional automorphic objects 
€ 
amObtor  and 
€ 
amObtub  given we
instantaneously will also get the looked for toposes of emergence 
€ 
TopamObtor  and
€ 
TopamObtub  (or more generally a topos of emergence
€ 
TopamOb2−dim ).
=======================================================
4.4 The emergence of existence 2.0
Existence is together with nonexistence one of the only two attributes of the
underlying substance.
Therefore existence doesn’t just emerge in the course of pregeometric
complexifications. These pregeometric complexifications provide a necessary, yet
by far not sufficient condition for (the emergence of) existence. Existence cannot
emerge, if the structure, it would become attached to, would not suffice to carry
existence, which here means actual (pre)physicality. If however the level of
complexity, prerequisited for carrying existence, eventually is given, then
existence or actual (pre)physicality is just another form or way of encoding the
ineffable underlying substance, namely information.
Again, let me point that out most forcefully: the emergence of existence is not a
result, a consequence  or subsequence of the structural complexification, which led
us from elementary automorphic objects to mereotopological automata or perhaps
spinnetworks, but it is immediate to the ineffable substance, of which elementary
automorphic objects or mereotopolgical automata or spin networks as well as any
physical, biological, social etc. entities are just other instantiations or encodings.
I.e. all nonexistent objects as well as all existent objects are instantiations or
encodings of the ineffable underlying substance, and the emergence of existence
must not be seen as the emergence of any existent objects up from a level of any
nonexistent objects. Existence is an attribute immediate to substance.
Thus, although existence ‘emerges’13 at a level of sufficient minimal structural
stability, existence doesn’t at all originate from that level of nonexistent objects
(and their structures) equipped with sufficient minimal structural stability, but
existence originates as an attribute immediate to substance.
But, even though existence is an attribute immediate to substance, a minimum
degree of structural stability, i.e. complexity of its informational equivalent (or
mathematical structure) is still required for actually effecting existence. Thus
existence emerges at a level of a certain complexity of objects, but it doesn’t
emerge by or through or for that complexity. Existence (or actuality) emerges for
the reason, that it is one of the only two attributes of substance, and for the implied
reason, that it is immediate to substance. The required complexity of the objects
for becoming existent is merely a necessary condition or constraint. It is neither
sufficient nor the very cause for the emergence of existence.
Since however a minimal structural stability or complexity is the necessary
condition for actually effecting existence, and since existence is the same as
actuality, then existence still emerges firstly at a that level of a minimal structural
stability or complexity, despite the fact, that it is by no means caused by that
minimal structural stability or complexity. So one might say, that only at that level
of a minimal structural stability or complexity existence appears, since without
that minimal structural stability or complexity existence couldn’t sustain.
To mark a distinction between existence as one of the two attributes of substance
on the one hand and the appearance of existence at a level of a required minimal
complexity on the other one might somewhat loosely call the latter ‘existence 2.0’.
No Vorrang of physicality
Relative state interpretation which is no many world interpretation.
5 Pregeometry II: It from Bit and more
5.1 It from Bit
                                                 
13 In the sense, that it becomes manifest.
5.2 It from Qbit
5.3 Relative states, recursiveness, and categorical dynamics
of eamObs and amObs
EamObs are already by their definition recursive, actually they are hardly much
more than just being recursive. Yet looked at any single eamOb its recursiveness
seems not to yield much more than some eternal recurrence, i.e an endless iteration
of mostly the same, at best distinguished by the numbers of the iterations.
But that does not take into account the possibilities of (mis)happenings or copying
failures or creations, if only enough possibility for that exists. And that possibilty
exists, if the eamObs already are objects of Quantum Mechanics. Than the
superposed relative states of all eamObs are respectively and become increasingly
connected.
Now the question arises, how the eamObs and amObs can be objects of Quantum
Mechanics. First of all they are no physical objects at all. But there have been
already many other theoretical models, which apply quantum mechanical features
to non physical entities, one of these attempts we’ve just encountered in the
previous paragraph. The orthodox view which centers QM at measurement acts (or
the Meßprozeß) as the cornerstone and embodiment of a solely physicalist view of
QM has already for a long time lost its prevalence. And since eamObs and amObs
are also certainly no observables any observership will also play no role.
The quantum mechanical approach, which best will fit for such a pregeometrical
sphere as that of eamObs and amObs is in my view the relative state interpretation
of QM introduced by Hugh Everett.14 This interpretation of QM is commonly
known under the label ‘Many World interpretation of QM’ coined by Bryce de
Witt.
I’ve already earlier objected the common understanding, that the Many World
interpretation of QM is entirely the same as the relative state interpretation, albeit
that understanding apparently was shared by Hugh Everett himself.15
The Many world interpretation is obviously a legitimate possible model of the
original relative state interpretation, but it is only so long such a compelling model
of the relative state interpretation as a certain tacit presupposition holds, namely
that the fundamental objects (of the universes or multiverses) to which it relates
are of a proper physicalist nature. If this presupposition or assumption doesn’t hold
                                                 
14 The relative state interpretation of QM essentially says, that all quantum mechanically
admissible states of a quantum mechanical object are equally and equivalently realized, and that
this statement relates to all quantum mechanically describable objects, including the respective
observers and the universes occupied by these observers. Thus the relative state interpretation of
QM avoids the notion of a collapse (of the wave function) as well as any anthropocentric
overvaluation of an observer, which are features to be appraised.
15 Private communication by David Deutsch.
anymore, then a completely different model of the original relative state
interpretation becomes at least as legitimate, and probably better applicable.
This would be a Quantum Information Interpretation of QM, where physicality
would be just one particular mode of information being encoded, with no primacy
or preeminence over any other mode (of information being encoded) attached to it.
That Quantum Informatiom Interpretation of QM then would allow, that all
relative states not actualized in the universe indicated by the presence of a
respective observer could perfectly be encoded either in other equally physical
universes than the index universe or in other alternatively physical universes or
rather parsimoniously in nonexistent, i.e. certainly non physical, and consequently
purely informational universes.
To put it in other words: the Many World interpretation of QM is only as long a
compelling model of the original relative state interpretation of QM as the
presupposition is made, that the nature of the substance of everything is physical.
In information monism that presupposition is inadmissible and is strictly rejected.
Yet if it is assumed, that the all pervasive and all encompassing substance is of an
essentially informational nature, then the relative states immediately have to be of
the same nature, namely of an informational making, even, if in some cases that
informational making should eventually be of that particular kind of encoded
information, which is known as ‘physical’.
In the case of the eamObs and amObs that particular physical encoding of their
information plays no role at all, since the eamObs and amObs are nonexistent
objects anyway, and any particular physicality is just and only a mode of existent
objects.
5.4 A cascade of emergent Abstract Automata
Konrad Zuse
Edward Fredkin 
(http://www.digitalphilosophy.org/Home/tabid/57/Default.aspx)
5.5 QuIA
Abstract quantum information automaton
Any elementary automorphic object 
€ 
eamObof the elementary automorphic objects
€ 
eamObni can – already due to its particular categorical structure – itself be seen as
an automaton, i.e. it undoubtedly has an input state or object 
€ 
eamObnx , an
intermediary state or object 
€ 
eamObn'x , i.e. quite literally the respective ‘black
box’, and a target state or object 
€ 
eamObnx+1 . The abstract quantum information
automaton QuIA then is just the entire ensemble of these elemantary quantum
information automata states 
€ 
eamObni .
5.6 QuCnctA
Abstract quantum connection automaton
5.7 QuctgA
Abstract quantum contiguent automaton is emergent of QuCnctA
5.8 QCellA
Quantum Cellular Automaton
An abstract quantum contiguent automaton QuctgA has as its proper
models/instantiations Quantum cellular Automata, since being contiguent is as
well a necessary as a sufficient condition for being a cellular automaton.
5.9 The emergence of existence 2.1
Spin networks as physically interpreted quantum cellular automata.
A quantum cellular automaton then provides as well a sufficient structural stability
or complexity as also a sufficient interaction resp. propagation matrix to serve as
an appropriate fixative for existence (i.e. the other of the only two attributes of
substance), which, untill the stage of the emergent nonexistent objects ‘quantum
cellular automata’ had been reached, could not persevere in the emergent mode of
(or as) existent objects.
6 The emergence of higher complexity: categorification of
the subvenient levels: automorphic structures,
recursiveness, and categorifaction
Elementary automorphic objects, categorified eamobs  cellular automata 
spin networks
Autocatalytic cycles biological systems
Mirror thesis M. Arbib P. Grice recursive (circular interactive propagation)
creation of meaning (and thus language and thought)
7 Toposes in mereologies
7.1  mereotopological connectedness, composition  and
contiguity
Argumentation: mereologies with toposically generated parts as means of
restricting composability i.e. reducing the infinities of universally compositional
mereological ontologies to the plurality of ‘dynamically’ consistent ones.
Lit.: Gideon Rosen & Cian Dorr, COMPOSITION AS A FICTION
        Jonathan Schaffer, Is there a fundamental Level?
Ben Caplan , Chris Tillman & Patrick Reeder, parts of 
singletons
bb) … to prephysics
aaa) Mereotopological contiguity with emergent QCoA as a
matrix of …
bbb) Spin networks
I use ‘contiguity’ as the notion of a topological property of ‘densely
ordered discrete elements’ and c-contiguity as the notion of a topological property
of ‘connected discrete elements’ i.e. as in contrast to continuity with respect to the
power of the continuum on the one hand and also in contrast to the disjointness or
separation (including ordinary neighborhood or nearness) of discrete elements on
the other. A paradigmatic case for ‘c-contiguent or connected discrete elements’
would be a chainlike structure, e.g. linked toroidal elements.
Def.: QCoA = quantum contiguent automaton resp. quantum contiguent
automata.
Against (quantum) cellular automata , a (quantum) cellular automaton
implies at least a weak metric, i.e. a metric with relative distances defined, for the
contiguent ordering of its elements.
The proposed pregeometry then is an countably infinite topol.space,
i.e. a contiguous topol. space with the density of Q.
c A topos of emergence – continued: by mereotopological dynamics to
computing pregeometry
Lit.:Th. Mormann, Updating Classical mereology
Th.Mormann, Structural Universals as Structural Parts
(Th.Mormann, Topological Representations of
Mereological Systems)
1 Philosophical impact
a The substance of objects: Information Monism
b Objects and (what’s instead of) universals: essentialist nominalism
c The polite version of ontological opportunism in science: ontological
commitment.
One is so long ontological committed to one’s objects as long one believes
in their existence.
d Objectology’s or ‘The theory of objects’ apparent expansion of the
objectological versus the usually discussed ontological universe(s) brings
to light the fact that regarding the question of distinguishing and accepting
something as ontological qualified is not in the first row question of
ontological commitment but rather a question of ontological admittance.
Ontologies are ever changing, rather fluid and/or blurred ensembles of
objects and beliefs varying, altering and moving in the all-encompassing
environment of objectology, the elements of them always gaining or
loosing their distinguished status as ontologicals more or less easily and by
that entering or leaving the ontological zone from or to the encompassing
sphere of otherwise seemingly rather nonexistent objects.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 basic ideas:
• The concept of pregeometry used in Combinatorial Geometry and Model Theory i.e.
the matroid might perfectly fit the proposed structure again independently called
‘pregeometry’ by J.A.Wheeler. He looked for ‘pregeometry’ as a matrix for geometry
i.e. he looked for it as a structure of which geometry eventually emerges.
The matroid now suffices the main conditions laid out by Wheeler for the purpose he
requested:
a A matroid is a very scarce structure.
b In particular a matroid doesn’t carry any topology.
c By closure matroids give rise to respective geometries.
• The elements of such a pregeometry for prephysics then cannot consist of common
mathematical structures and objects entirely. The relational structures will be the
same as in respective matroids. Yet the objects of these relations can not be the usual
points, locales, numbers or even fields. None of these can ever be thought of as being
such utmost fundamental as it is required for the intended purpose.
• ‘Closure by itself’ i.e. closure by (emerging) connectivity.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terminology:
nonexistent objects : e.g fictionals, paraconsistentials like ‘dead living cats’ (aka Schrödinger’s
pet) incl. transconsistentials e.g. ‘round square’,  (cf. G.Priest), consistentials ( = objects of
science) incl. such which are intended to be existentials,
existent objects or existentials = actually existing objects, i.e. objects, with which one can
actually interact directly or indirectly.
ThoOb on properties/attributes: properties or attributes of existentials have for themselves no
autonomous or self-sufficient existence, i.e. no actual existence independent of the existentials
they are properties/attributes of.16 Therefore the appearances/occurrences of any such attributes
are no independent instantiations of the nonexistent objects, which are designated (and somehow
created) by the substantival use of their respective denotations. Such nonexistent objects, like for
example witchcraft, levitation, redness, weight, isoscelesness etc., which are made of objectified
attributes then can be of any kind of nonexistent objects: fictionals, paraconsistentials or
consistentials.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 concurrent concepts of ‘object’:
• meinongian objects as introduced in the ‘theory of objects’
• the concept of object as introduced by Irving Stein in his ‘The concept of object as the
foundation of physics’
• the concept of object of topos theory. The general concept of object as introduced in
category- and topos theory differs from the conventional meaning of ‘mathematical
object’ namely being (eqivalent to) a mathematical model. Any particular objects in
categories and topses are of course the respective models of the mathematical structures
involved. Yet the idea or general concept of a category- or topostheoretical object as such
is rather a generalization or meta-model where all these mathematical structures and
models are mere possible instantiations of.
Topos of Emergence TopEm:
• initial object: a matroid of Automorphic Objects
• terminal object: TQFT
--------------------------
§ 2 b Extensionalism – baseless
The extensionalist dogma reaching from Kant’s statement that ‘existence is not a
real predicate’ “Being is evidently not a real predicate“ . I. Kant, ??? to Quine’s slogan that
‘To be is the value of a bound variable.’ imposed a serious and perhaps harmful
confinement on the range of logical analysis and the prolific power of scientific
exploratory advance.
                                                 
16  In a more profound analysis such ‘ordinary’ existentials as well as the respective nonexistent
objects they are instantiations of might however turn out to be objectified complexes of attributes
of deeper sited structures.
H.Putnam, ‘Models and Reality’ this model theoretically refined version of Quine’s
‘underdetermination of the theory of nature’ thesis exposes the ‘failure of extensionalism’ most
impressively. Yet that failure of extensionalism is indeed just selfinflicted.
Since the disillusioning result that by not referring definitely a theory by means of its models
eventually isn’t referring properly at all is just due to the unwarranted claim that theories and
models as such had to refer to some extratheoretical actuality at all.
Yet theories and their models do not refer for the very reason that they cannot refer. They are
made of definitions, theoretical terms and a vast amount of various mathematical (including
logical) tools. And the way they are related to an extratheoretical actuality is by by practical
means17 only and ultimately by acts of designation.
Putnam’s approach in ‘Models and Reality’ must however not be brought down to such a
simplistic question of if ( and if ‘yes’, how) theories or their models refer to an extratheoretical
world. It is rather about the question if the resp. models (of a theory) are unambigously satisfied
by definite sets.
------------------------------
Definition: existentials in difference to non existing objects must at least possibly be able to
interact with the environment, i.e. existentials are objects, which (actually) exist.
Most scientists won’t probably ever care about the statement that the objects of science are (at
least: actually) nonexistent, let alone that they would agree. And in nearly all of their work the
various sorts of more or less naive (sometimes perhaps: fictional) realism they seem to maintain
works perfectly well for all their different purposes.
Yet that could impossibly hold in one important case, namely in the case if or when a sort of
rather normal (nonexistent) objects of science i.e. objects of physics would come into their
peculiar state of ascribed ‘existence’ by emergence of a sphere of even more radically
nonexistent objects, namly ones which are non- respectively pre-physical ones.
And that’s the very point for what Meinong’s theory of objects matters not just for science yet in
particular for (any proper Theory of) Everything (ToE). Any such ToE has to give an answer to
the fundamental question of metaphysics: “Why there is something rather than nothing?” And the
best way to find this answer seems to be to explore how something i.e. a primordial structure of
physics came into being up from a stage of non-being. Or – to give a shorter yet more confusing
version of that: how existence came into existence. Probably it could be helpful if such primordial
emergence could be partially described as a transition from one kind of nonexistent objects to
another (so to say: enriched) one.
The ‘fundamental physical object’ is obviously (contained in) the structure which consists of the
total energy and total momentum of the universe at the stage of its initial emergence.
The primordial emergence of the most elementary structures of physics i.e. the primordial
emergence of physics itself from radical prephysics then has to be seen as the emergence of
                                                 
17 E.g. in the preparation and execution of experiments or in ‘successful applications’ of the
theory. possibly directly or indirectly
nonexistent objects which are intended to be entities from (a sphere of) nonexistent objects which
are not and - more importantly - which cannot be proper entities at all.
Entities are supposed to – at least possibly – actually exist, i.e. it is supposed that one can actually
or at least interact with such entities.
Appendices
7.2 Elementary Meroses (i.e. severely restrained Toposes) of
emergence built on higher dimensional gunk: weak 2-
categories (
€ 
2−amObtor,
€ 
2−amObtub )
A meros is meant to be a category of mereologies. In particular a meros should
carry a categorical dynamic like the one once proposed by F.W.Lawvere.
Therefore a meros has inevitably very closely to mimic (the structure of) a topos,
yet purified of its set theoretical innards, and by that also purified of the Platonic
presumptions of empty abstractedness, which are inseparably adjunct with that set
theoretical characteristic.
Meroses would gain a great deal of naturality and by that also of nominalistic
rigour in comparison to a topos of mereologies, but then they would only do so for
the very cost of universality compared with toposes.
‘meros’ stands for an abbreviation of ‘mereolgical space’, therefore the plural should
go as ‘meroses’ (for ‘mereological spaces’). As in the case of ‘topos’, where topos
originally wasn’t meant to stand for the Greek term for ‘place’ or ‘location’, also
in the case of ‘meros’ meros doesn’t stand for the Greek word for ‘part’. A meros
is meant to be a mereolgically based analogon of a topos. A topos can be seen as a
categorical version of a set or a categorised set, a meros then should be seen as a
categorical version of mereology or a categorised mereology, with mereological
parts and mereological sums or mereological compositions as characteristic
objects. In a meros then a mereological part may very well be a mereological sum
itself and a mereological sum may be a mereological part in another setting or if
seen from another viewpoint. The morphisms between the objects in a meros are
not only the admitted mereological operations but all admitted dynamical relations
between the respective mereological parts and mereological sums as well.
The fact of (the) ‘matter’: Merosic foundations of existence
